Abstract--In this paper, we consider two types of equilibrium problems. We study the constrained Nash-type equilibrium problems with multivaiued payoff functions. We also study the competitive Nash-type equilibrium problems with multivaiued payoff functions. In these two equilibrium problems, we want to find a strategy combination such that each player wishes to find a minimal loss from his multivaiued payoff function. We use a fixed-point theorem of Park to prove the existence results of these two types of equilibrium problems.
INTRODUCTION
Recently, many authors have studied the existence of solutions of Pareto equilibria of constrained (also for nonconstrained) multiobjective game with vector payoff functions, for example, see [1] [2] [3] [4] and references therein. In all the previous results, the payoff functions are single-valued functions. But in some cases, for each strategy, the payoff may be one collection of things from many collections of things. Hence, the study of a vector equilibrium problem with multivalued payoff functions has some applications in the real world.
In this paper, we want to study two types of equilibrium problems with multivalued payoff functions.
First, we consider the constrained Nash-type equilibrium problem for multimap of Type I, A = (Xi, Si, Fi)ie~.
In this problem, let I be a finite or infinite index set and Xi be a topological space for each i • I, X = I-Iiei xi and X i = l-Ijei,j#i Xj. For each x • X, let xi and x i denote the/th coordinate of x and the projection of x on X i, respectively. In the sequel, we may write x = (x i, xi). For each i E I, let Zi be a real topological vector space with proper closed convex solid cone Ci, Fi : X i x X~ -oZi, Si : X i -oXi. One of our purposes is to study the problem of finding = (ff~)ieI • X 2i • F~(~ i, xi) such that for each i • I, xi • Si(xi), and z~ --5i ¢ --int C~, for all zi e F~ (~i, ~) and all ui • Si (~i).
If for each i ~ I, Fi is a single-valued function, Zi = R and Si(X ~) = Xi, our problem is to find = (ff:i)ie~ ~ X, such that for each i ~ I, g'i ~ Si(~i), and
F, e,) < (e', for all e X,
Then this problem reduces to the Nash equilibrium problem [5] . If for each i E I, Fi is a single-valued function and Zi = R, then this problem reduces to the Debreu social equilibrium problem [6] . We also study the constrained competitive Nash-type equilibrium problems A t = (Xi, Yj, Sj, Ti,
Fj, Gi)jEJ, iEI.
In this problem, I and J denote the finite index sets, Xi and Yj denote the strategy sets of the ith and jth players of these two families (say Families A and B) of players, respectively; Sj : X -oYj is the constrained correspondence which restricts the strategy of the ith player of forallaiEGi (vi,9) , viETi (9) , and all i E I.
This problem has applications in the real world. We now demonstrate an example of this kind of equilibrium problem in real life. Let I denote the index set of factories in Company A and J denote the index set of factories in Company B. We assume that the products between the factories in the same company are different, while some collections of products are the same and some collections of products are different between different factories in different companies. Therefore, the strategy of the jth factory in Company A depends on the strategies of all factories in Company B. The payoff function Fj of the jth factory in Company A depends on its strategy and all the strategies of factories in Company B. Similarly, the strategy of the k th factory in Company B depends on the strategies of all factories in Company A.
The payoff function Gk depends on its strategy and all the strategies of factories in Company A.
With this strategies combination, each factory can choose a collection of products which minimize the loss or gain of each factory.
If Fj and Gi are single real-valued functions for all i E I and j E J, then the second problem reduces to the problem of finding • = (~i)iel E 1-LEI xi, 9 = (gj)jeJ E Fijej Yj such that 
G~ (5=~, 9) >-Gi(xi, Y),
for all xi E Ti (9) and all i E I.
The payoff (or gain) functions of these two types of equilibrium problems are vector multimaps. The main tool in this paper is a fixed-point theorem of Park [7] . 
(
iN) A point fl E A is called a vector m/n/mal point (respectively, weakly vector minimal point) of A if t'or any y E A, y -~ ~ -C \ {0} (respectively, y -fl ~ -int C).'Moreover, the set of vector minimal points (respectively, weakly vector minimal points) of A is denoted by
Mine A (respectively, wMine A).
DEFINITION 2. (See [8].) Let X be a nonempty convex subset of a real t.v.s. E, Z a real t.v.s. with a convex cone C such that C ~ Z. Let G : X -oZ be a multimap. Then G is said to be C-quasi-convex if for any z E Z, the set {xEX[ there is a y E G(x) such that z -y E C}
is convex.
(See [9] .) Let X and Y be two nonempty subsets of topologica2 spaces E1 and E2, 
(x) c T(x) and X = ~Juer int G-(y). Then T has a continuous selection f : X --+ Y, that is, f : X -+ Y is a continuous function such that f(x) E T(x) for each x E X.
LEMMA 5. (See [13] .) Let X be a convex subset of topological vector space and Z be a topological vector space with a closed convex cone C such that int C ~ 9. Let F : X -oZ be a multimap.
(1) For any fixed e E intC and any fixed a E Z, then the function ~ : Z --+ R defined by
is a continuous and strictly monotonically increasing function from
If F is C-quasiconvex, then the composition multimap ~F : X -oR is R+-quasiconvex. LEMMA 6. (See [13] .) Let REMARK. In Theorem 3.1, if we assume that I is any index set and for each x i • X ~, Mi(x i) is a convex set, then we have the same conclusion.
As a simple consequence of This completes the proof of the theorem.
for (x i, Yi) • X i x Yi. Then there exist ~ = (xi)iez E X and ff = (Yi)iel • Y such that for each i • I, ~i • S~(xi), ~li • Ti(~i), and there exists a zi • Fi(xi,~li,~2i) satisfying

Then we have
Hi(x i) = {ui • Si (xi) l Fi (xi,fi (x i) ,ui) N wMinc, Fi (xi,fi (x i) ,Si (xi)) ~
O} = {ui • Si (xi)[ Gi (xi,uc) N wMinc~Gi (xi, Si (x~)) ¢ @}.
REMARK. In Theorem 3.1, if for each i E I, Fi is a single-valued function, Zi = R and Si(x s) = Xi and for each x i E X i, ui ~ Fs(x i, ui)
is convex, then Theorem 3.1 reduces to the Nash equilibrium theorem [5] . If for each i E I, F~ is a single-valued function, Zs = R and for each x i E X i, ui ~ Fs(x i, ui) is convex, then Theorem 3.1 reduces to the Debreu social equilibrium theorem [6] . As a simple consequence of Theorem 3.1, we have the weight Nash-type equilibrium theorem. 
ii) For each x i E X i, the set {us E'Si (xS)[ minG, (xS, Si (xi)) E Gs (xS,ui) } is acyclic.
Then there exist • = (2i)icl E X and 2i E Fi(Y),~i) such that for each i E I, ~ E Ss(~i), and ws • z, >
• for zs e and e .
PROOF. The conclusion of Theorem 3.3 follows from Theorem 3.1 by letting Zs = R and Cs = [0, 1] in Theorem 3.1 for all i E I.
REMARK. In Theorem 3.3, Condition (ii) can be replaced by (ii) t, where
(ii)' for each fixed x s E X i, the function ui -oFs(x i, ui) is R~_i-convex.
The following theorem gives a characterization of C-quasiconvexity of a multimap. 
PROOF. Suppose G is C-quasiconvex. Then for all z E Z, the set B(z) --{x E X : there is a y E G(x) such that y < z} is convex. Let xl, x2 E X, A E [0, 1], zl E G(xl), and z2 E G(x2). Let z E U(Zl, z2). Then z _> zl and z _> z2. Hence, xl, x2 E B(z). By assumption, B(z) is convex and Axl + (1 -A)x2 E B(z). Therefore, there exists a y E G[Axl + (1 -A)x2] such that y _< z. This shows that yE z --C for all z E u(zl,z2).
Conversely, if for any xl, x2 E X, A E [0,1], zl E G(xl), and z2 E G(x2), there exists a y E G[Axl + (1 -A)x2] such that y E z -C for all z E u(zl,z2). Let z E C and Ul, u2 E B(z), then there exist Wl E G(ul) and w2 E G(u2) such that Wl E z -C, w2 E z -C. Then z E U(Wl,W2). By assumption, there exists a yE G[AUl + (1 -A)u2] such that y < z. This shows that AUl + (1 -A)u2 E B(z) and B(z) is convex for all z E Z. Hence, G is C-quasiconvex.
As a simple consequence of Theorems 3.1 and 3.4, we have the following lemma. As a consequence of Lemma 3.5, we have the following theorem. THEOREM 3.6. Let I be an index set and {E/}iel be a family of locally convex t.v.s.
For each i E I, let Xi be a compact convex subset of E/, Si : X / -oXs a continuous multimap with nonempty closed values, Z~ a real t.v.s, with a proper dosed convex solid cone C~ which induces an order on Zi. Suppose that for each i E I, let Fi : X / x X~ -oZi is a continuous multimap with compact values and for each x i E X i, u~ -oF/(x/, u/) is Ci-quasiconvex. Then there exist an 2 = (~/)/el E X, 2/ • Fi(~2/, ~i) such that for each i • I, ~2/ • S/(~i), and
for all z/ E Fi (~i, ui) and all ui E S~ (~)). 
